University of Missouri, St. Louis

IRL @ UMSL
UMSL Global
1-1-1993

German Unification and European Security - The Influence of
Economic Developments and German Domestic Politics
Jonathan Sperber

Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/cis
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Sperber, Jonathan, "German Unification and European Security - The Influence of Economic Developments
and German Domestic Politics" (1993). UMSL Global. 206.
Available at: https://irl.umsl.edu/cis/206

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in UMSL
Global by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.

Occasional Paper No. 9306
September, 1993

Occasional Papers
The Center for International Studies
of the University of Missouri-St. Louis
issues Occasional Papers at irregular
intervals from ongoing research projects,
thereby providing a viable means for
communicating tentative results. Comments
on these papers, therefore, are particularly
welcome. Occasional Papers should not be
reproduced or quoted at length without the
consent of the author or of the Center for
International Studies.

German Unification and
European Security: The Influence
of Economic Developments and
German Domestic Politics
Jonathan Sperber

German Unification and European Security:
The Influence of Economic Developments and German Domestic Politics

Jonathan Sperber
Department of History
University of Missouri, Columbia
Columbia, MO 65211

While it is clear to everyone that the unification of the two German states will have
momentous consequences for every aspect of life throughout Europe, it has not proven easy
to predict just what these consequences will be. Events have confounded the experts and
prognosticators and continue to provide surprises on an almost daily basis. Prediction does
tend to work by extrapolating the past into the future, only the basic framework for Germany
within Europe between 1949 and 1989-the two states, the two alliance systems, the two
Superpowers-has vanished and no longer provides a guide to current events.

This is

particularly true for considerations of security problems: events have not just rendered
irrelevant the former concentration on potential military confrontations between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact; .they have thrown into doubt the further validity of a predominantly
mi~itary and diplomatic view of security.
An additional difficulty for academics concerned with the topic can be seen in the
organization of scholarly volumes devoted to the consequences of German unification.
Typically, they are divided into a series of topical essays, with each expert holding forth in
his or her area of expertise: economic growth, the labor market, German political parties,
the EEC, German foreign policy, and the like. Such an organization tends to obscure the
possibility of influences across areas separate in academic study but connected in life: the
possiblity that changes in the German labor market, for instance, might have an effect on
Germany's relations with the EEC, that the conflicts and competition between the German
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political parties might influence the country's foreign policy, or that decisions on exchange
and interest rates might have an important bearing on security policy. 1
In this essay, I would like to consider some of these interconnections. My starting
point will be the consequences of unification for the economy of the former East Germany,
particularly in the context of the economic policies of first the West German and then the
all-German government. From there, I will move on to the economic consequences of
unification for the former West Germany, and then to the upshot of these .economic
developments for politics in the newly united Germany. These recent developments in
German domestic affairs will form the basis for some concluding suggestions about the
relationship between a united Germany and Europe and about the potential consequences of
German unification for creating a framework of prosperity, stability and security in Europe.

1. The East German Economy Meets the Free Market

The German Democratic Republic approached German unification with an economy in
dreadful shape. Years of under- and misinvestment, capped off in the 1980s by a desperate
drive to gain western currency at any price, combined with heavy state subsidies for
consumption in the ultimately unsuccessful hope of pacifying popular discontent, had
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Two examples of this sort of work are Ulrike Liebert and Wolfgang Michel (ed.), Die
Politik zur deutschen Einheit: Probleme-Strategien-Kontroversen (Opladen, 1991) and Paul B.
Stares, (ed.), The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington, D.C., 1992).
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produced an aging industrial plant and a crumbling infrastructure. 2 Any traveler in the GDR
during the second half of the 1980s could not miss the signs of decay: trains three-quarters
of an hour late for a trip scheduled to take fifteen minutes, phone booths with phones that did
not work, or phone connections that vanished in the middle of a conversation; frighteningly
potholed roads and rusting bridges; older housing stock that had never been maintained and
leff to fall into ruin, with modem replacements in little better shape; 1930s era factories
whose polluting emissions could be immediately and strongly perceived without the slightest
need for sensitive measuring instruments; and, omnipresent, a distinct odor in the air,
combining the high-sulfur-content brown coal used for power and heat with the smoky
exhaust from the Trabis, the little East German cars powered by outdated lawnmower
engines. To rebuild this infrastructure, replace existing industrial plant with world class,
environmentally more sustainable factories and provide adequate housing is a formidable
task, and _one that will cost a lot of money. The most recent estimates are 3.5 trillion DM,
about $2 trillion, at the current rate of exchange. 3
If the precise costs of this enterprise were not entirely clear in the first half of 1990,
when the crucial decisions concerning the shape of German unification were made, the
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My discussion of the East German economy, government economic policies and the
economic consequences of unification relies heavily on three studies and any otherwise uncited
assertions draws on them: Andreas Busch, "Die deutsch-deutsche Wa.hrungsunion: Politisches
Votum trotz okonomisches Bedenken," in Liebert and Michel ed., Die Politik zur deutschen Einheit,
pp. 185-207; Horst Siebert, Die Wagnis der Einheit, (Stuttgart, 1992) and lrwin-L. Collier, Jr.,
"Instant Integration and Gradual Convergence-Program Notes to the Macroeconomic Drama of
German Unification," German Studies Review 16 (1993): 312-30.
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approximate dimensions of the task were apparent and the government of the Federal
Republic of Germany quickly developed a strategy that it hoped would smooth the transition
from a centrally planned to a market economy and facilitate the work of reconstruction. To
understand this strategy, it is important to recall the pre-1989 history of the conservative
governing coalition of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. It had come to power in 1982 as part of the
world wide trend towards an economic policy emphasizing the importance of free markets, a
reduced role for the state, lower taxes and lower social welfare expenditures. This
intellectual vision remained strong at the end of the decade and would provide a guide to
initial policy on the ec.onomic aspects of unification. 4
The collapse of the GDR and the other states of the Eastern bloc was taken as the
final proof of the superiority of the free market over state intervention in economic affairs.
If state intervention was the problem, the solution was the quickest and most radical return
possible to private property, competition and the free market. Even before the two German
states were formally united, there would be a currency union and the introduction into East
Germany of West German law regarding property, taxes and economic activity. Property
confiscated by the communist regime would be returned to its original owners or their heirs.
(The "two plus four" talks on German unification made an exception for property taken
between 1945 and 1949 in the then Soviet zone of occupation.) The large, state run concerns
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Most English-language commentary on _the conservative intellectual climate in: West
Germany during the 1980s has focused on the nationalist reinterpretation of the Nazi era, the socalled Historikerstreit. However, the conservative trend in German politics-that Germans called
die Wende, the turnabout-was broader and included a good deal of enthusiasm for laissez-faire
economics, and the ideas of Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman. A good essay on how this trend
affected the ,thinking of the Sachverstiindigenrat, the West German government's Council of
Economic Advisers, is Rudolf Hjckel, "Dreillig und kein bi8chen weise," Die Zeit, 20 Aug. 1993.

5
would be administered by a "Trusteeship Agency" [Treuhandanstalt] that would sell them off
to the highest bidder, or, if no one wanted them, close them down.
By liberating the forces of the free market from the constraints of the state, and
exposing the formerly closed economy to the bracing effects of worldwide economic
competition, Kohl's experts expected to unleash a burst of entrepreneurial dynamism that
would quickly and painlessly put East Germany on the road to economic reconstruction. In
taking these decisions, state officials and private commentators frequently referred to the
precedent of 1948, when a currency reform and a dismantling of Nazi era and wartime
economic controls in the future West Germany had paved the way for the celebrated
"economic miracle" of the 1950s. Indeed, there were those in and out of the government
who hoped that the former East Germany would become a sort of model capitalist country,
and by example and pressure of the market help move the former West Germany further in a
laissez-faire direction, curbing further the power of trade unions, cutting taxes on business
and upper-income groups and slashing welfare expenditures-all objectives that up to 1989
Kohl had been noticeably less abl~ to accomplish than his fellow conservative leaders Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 5
The contrast between the hopes of the government for post-unification economic
developments-hopes, that to judge by the convincing victories of the CDU in the free.
elections in East Germany in .the first half of 1990 and in the all-German elections in
December of that year, were widely shared by the population-and the actual course of the

5

For one example of such plans, with regard to taxes on business, see Klaus-Peter Schmid,
"Nicht mehr als eine Fata Morgana," Die Zeit, 28 September 1990.

economy is as striking as it was unexpected. Far from unleashing a wave of economic
growth, the free market measures brought on an economic decline in the former East
Germany that has not yet been reversed. Indeed, a major role in this decline was played by
the very measure that was supposed to bring on the upswing, the currency union of July
1990.
While one DM ,had bought about six East German Marks on the semi-legal market in
1990, for the currency union savings were exchanged at the rate of 1:1 for the first 3,000
Marks and 2: 1 thereafter; prices and salaries were converted at 1: 1. This meant that with
one stroke every product in East Germany increased in price six-fold, and every West
German product, as well as those manufactured in other advanced capitalist countries,
became six times cheaper. Since East German products were generally of a lower quality
than those produced in the west, there was no reason for consumers to buy them.
As the domestic market for East German goods collapsed, the worldwide competition
to which such goods were exposed with the currency union was bringing the export market
for these goods to an end. Prior to 1990, seventy percent of East German exports had gone
to the communist countries of Eastern Europe, who paid for these exports, not with
convertible currency, but through the finance and clearing arrangements (the so-called
"transfer ruble"),of COMECON. The end of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe
brought with it the end of COMECON; imports had to be paid for in hard currency, so
overpriced and poor quality East German goods had to compete with better and cheaper
products from, say, West Germany, Sweden, the United States, South Korea or Japan. With
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the abolition of COMECON at the end of 1990, the exports of the former East Germany
dropped by two-thirds, literally overnight, and have not yet recovered. 6
Why should post-communist eastern Germany have had to be content with its
communist era industrial plant? Advocates of the free market solution expected that the
currency and economic union would bring with it a wave of investment, both from West
German firms and from potential East German entrepreneurs, creating new businesses and
modernizing existing ones. This investment, however, has largely failed to take place.
Perhaps the major factor inhibiting investments has been the regulations concerning the
restitution of nationalized property. _Title to any property is not cleared until the claims of
the original owners or their heirs have been satisfied-and there have been a lot of claims,
but as yet little satisfaction, since the courts are far too understaffed to deal with them all.
As of mid-1992, some 2.2 million claims for restitution have been filed, but only 8.4% of
them resolved. While the proceedings grind on, investors are reluctant to act, since there is
always the danger that their businesses or-the land on which they are located (about threefourths of restitution claims are for real estate) might tum out to belong to someone else. 7
This situation has primarily affected small investors and potential East German
entrepreneurs-who, admittedly, were expected to create the most jobs. Large West German
firms, that could easily hire the legal talent to deal with such conflicting property claims,
quickly discovered more interesting parts of the ex-communist world for investment
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purposes. Labor in the Czech Republic, Poland or Hungary, close in training and skill levels
to that of the former East Germany, is available for a small fraction of the cost. Michael
Fuchs, president of the Federal Association of the German Wholesale and Import-Export
Trade, put it quite crudely when he noted that one German worker, 11costs as much as 11 70
Russians, 38 Bulgarians, 18 Poles, 17 Czechs or 10 Hungarians. " 8
Since firms in the former East Germany have not been able to compete, either at
home or abroad, and since the investments that might have enabled them to do so have ·not
been made, they have just closed down. By the end of 1992, industrial output was only 35 %
of what it had been three years previously. Employment has declined just as drastically: of
3.5 million industrial jobs in 1989, just 700,000 remain by the summer of 1993. Officially,
unemployment rates have not climbed above twenty percent-a high enough figure, but an
enormous underestimation of the problem. People in government make-work programs and
in state-sponsored job-training programs are not counted as unemployed in German statistics.
Additionally, there are those working short-time, often zero hours a week, plus about two
million people who have left the labor market altogether: workers in their fifties forced to
take early retirement, women unable to work as firms, desperate to cut costs, closed the
childcare facilities they had operated under the communist regime. Totaling all these
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together, we find that about one half the 1989 East German labor force is currently
unemployed, a very discouraging result for the unleashing of dynamic market forces. 9
Precisely this disappointing outcome has led to a good deal of criticism of the original
decisions and a belated search by the government for some policy options. True believers in
the free market insist that their ideas would have worked if they had only been carried out
completely, particularly if the currency union had been at the market exchange rate rather
than the distinctly non-market 1: 1. In fact, the decision to unify the currencies at that rate
came in for a good deal of criticism-albeit generally muted-from the Bundesbank, the
German Central Bank, the Sachverstandigenrat, the German Council of Economic Advisers,
and a number of other sources. When _the disastrous results of the currency union became
apparent and were too late to change, previously quiet and reserved critics made their
objections public and a whole host of new critics appeared.
Not to speak for what was clearly a bad decision, but the alternative of a currency
union at the market exchange rate would have had its problems as well. In 1989, the
average monthly wage in East Germany was about 1400 East German Marks;_ had these
been converted at the market rate, than the typical wage-earner would have taken home some
235 DM monthly, while an unmarried West German welfare recipient received 650-700 DM
each month, plus money for rent. In other words, had the currency union taken place at the
6: 1 free market rate, most East Germans would have had incomes well below the subsistence
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Siebert, Wagnis der Einheit, p. 37; Collier, "Instant Integration," p. 313; Sommer, "Der
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level, and would have required substantial and expensive government assistance to make ends
meet-circumstances a government committed to the free market, and desiring to cut back on
social welfare expenditures had no desire to bring about. In addition, such an exchange
would have devalued the savings of most East Germans. (Because basic necessities were
sold at subsidized low prices under the communist regime, and more expensive consumer
goods were frequently unavailable, many East Germans had built up substantial cash balances
in their savaings accounts.) The government was hoping that these savings would be used to
start small businesses, particularly in the service sector, and so provide jobs for people
working in industries that would have to be closed down.
One area where policy did tum around was with regard to the disposition of formerly
state-owned enterprises by the Trusteeship Agency. Expected buyers for these firms, most of
which were thoroughly uncompetitive on the world market, did not emerge, and through
early 199_1 the managers of the agency followed the course of shutting down the unsalable
enterprises and dismissing the people employed in them. Indeed, at a meeting of the
executive committee of the agency's governing body in January 1991, a high official of the
Ministry of Finance pounded on the table and announced "There must be dieing!" in
reference to the need to close down unprofitable enterprises. Two weeks later, when
Chancellor Kohl visited Eisenach, where the Trusteeship Agency had just closed down the
Wartburg auto works, he was met by egg-throwing demonstrators. After that, policy quickly
changed, and the Trusteeship Agency began putting money into the firms it was managing,
and offering increasingly favorable terms to investors, in effect paying them to take over the
businesses. This has meant a substantial expenditure of public funds; but the Agency has

11

succeeded in selling most of the formerly state-owned firms in its possession. It remains to
be seen, though, just how successful they will be in private ownership. 10
The one decision universally recognized as a disaster was making restitution of
nationalized property the main priority, instead of offering expropriated owners compensation. This decision was a good example of neglecting the lessons of history, since the West
German government's compensation program for property losses incurred during the Nazi
regime and the Second World War-the "equalization of burdens" [Lastenausgleich]-has
proven quite successful. Blame for the decision to give restitution priority has been offered
quite widely-commitment to private property, fear that the German Supreme Court would
overturn any compensation scheme and insist on restitution,· a desire to avoid expenditures
for compensation, pressure from the real estate lobby-but, in any event, once the decision
was made and the judicial machinery for it cranked up, it cannot be rescinded. There have
been several small modifications to the original commitment to restitution, but the basic
decision remains in place and continues to exert a paralyzing or at least delaying effect on
investment. 11
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Peter Christ, "Zurn Siindenbock gestempelt," Die Zeit, 12 Apr. 1991; Ralf Neubauer,
"Quantensprung im Osten," Die-Zeit, 29 May 1992, and the interview with Birgit Breuel, current
head of the Trusteeship Agency, Die Zeit, 6 August 1993.
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2. From East to West
Nothing has yet stemmed the output in decline and employment in the former East
Germany, but it has not been accompanied, as such declines usually are, by a decline .in
consumption. Quite the opposite, East Germans' purchasing power was protected by
generous unemployment and early retirement benefits, as well as by the upward revaluation
of their savings ·as a result of the currency union at the 1: 1 exchange rate. They vigorously

purchased all sorts of western made consumer durables and semi-durables, from color TVs
and VCRs to couches and wall units. Above all, they bought automobiles. My own
personal impression during a brief visit to the former East Germany in the summer of
1991-only slightly exaggerated for effect-was that no one seemed to have a job, but
everyone had a new car. 1991 was in fact a record year for auto purchases, some 4.16
million new cars registered in Germany that year. 12
What was happening was the German government was pumping money into the
former East Germany. Some of that money was being used to improve the industrial
infrastructure-and substantial work has been done on modernizing telecommunications and
the rail network. Most of it, though, about sixty percent in 1991, for instance, was being
used to s~bsidize personal 'consumption of West German goods, whose purchase was helping
to put many East Germans out of work, requiring the government to put still more money
into East Germany, that could be used to purchase still more West German goods. If
unification led to an economic crisis in the east, it created boom conditions in the west.
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While economic output wJs declining sharply in the former East Germany during
1990 and
.
'

.

I

1991, the GNP was incre~sing by 4.9% and 3.6% respectively in the former West Germany,
i
I

the best showing in more µtan ten years.
!

An obvious questidn emerges here, namely where was all the money coming from
I

that was· being transferred lfrom the western to the eastern parts of Germany and then being

j
spent back in the west? The answer is that the government has spent it without having it.
I

'

I

The most recent figures s~ow an increase in the national debt from 475 billion DM in 1989
i

to an expected 1.35 trillio* DM by 1996. Finance Minister Theo Waigel, who has presided

I
over this substantial incre~se in government indebtedness, has strongly resisted substantial tax
i

increases or cutting other ~xpenses to cover the expenditures of unification. At first, he
I

,

I

asserted, rather in the matjner of American supply side economists of the early 1980s, that
'
I

the economic growth to b~ achieved by unleashing the free market in the ex-East Germany
I

I

would pay for any additio~l costs. As this proved not to be the case, he devoted his efforts

I
to improving the official blalance sheet by putting as much of these costs as he could manage
f

in special, off budget areak, such as the "German unity funds," or the "Upswing East." 13
I

!

i

In effect, the gove~ent had unintentionally launched a very large Keynesian deficitspending economic stimul*s program, although one that seems to have stimulated the

.

I

i

economy of the former W~st Germany, that did not need the stimulus, rather than that of the
II

former East Germany, tha~ badly needed it. This was quite a break with former policy, all
i

i

I
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Wolfgang Hoffmann,
"Kredit ohne Linie," Die Zeit, 1 May 1993. Siebert, Wagnis der
1
Einheit, chap. 9, is·devotedtto an extensive discussion of transfers from west to east in Germany
and the means of financing them.
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governments of West Germany-whether on the right or the left-having steadfastly refused
since the mid-1970s to implement such a stimulus package, in spite of frequent urgings from
Germany's major trading partners. It was, however, not a well timed break, since the
stimulus came as the economy of West Germany was culminating its long, slow, recovery
from the 1982 recession and reaching a peak at the end of the decade of the 1980s-precisely
when Keynesian theory says that such a stimulus should not be applied.
The results were also what Keynesian theory predicted, an outbreak of inflation,
prices in the former West Germany rising at about 4-5% a year since 1990. While this may
not seem like much to Americans, Germans are extremely sensitive to price increases, having
had two notoriously bad experiences with inflation in this century. The officials of the
Bundesbank, the German central bank, who had been skeptical both about the 1: 1 currency

union and the government's financial policy, now took the opportunity provided by these
figures to give force to their own views. Following the classic monetary anti-inflation
strategy, they started raising short term interest rates in 1990 and pushed them to a peak of
about 10 % in 1992, the highest they had been in Germany since the Great Depression of the
1930s. Making borrowed money so expensive dampened domestic economic activity; it also
brought foreign investors into the country, helping to finance the German federal govemment' s growing budget deficit, but also raising sharply the value of the D-Mark on world
money markets and thus making German exports more expensive and less competitive. All
these measures spelled recession: GNP growth in the former West Germany (economic
statistics are still kept separately on the two formerly separate states) declined continuously
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from its peak in 1990 and fell below zero in 1993. Latest expectations are for the GNP to
fall about two percent this year,- the sharpest drop since the end of the Second World War. 14
This severe recession, with its lowered tax receipts and greater social ·welfare
expenditures (unemployment compensation, for instance), puts a still greater strain on
-overburdened government finances, and threatens to lead to cutbacks in spending for
infrastructure improvement and income maintenance in the former East Germany. Having
provided a Keynesian stimulus at the wrong time, the government now seems _ready to
-

-

attempt to introduce substantial budget cuts in the midst of a recession, another perverse
move from the demand management point of view .15 However, the recession has revealed
deeper, structural problems in the economy of the former West Germany that were hidden
from view in the boom years of the late 1980s and early '90s.
One problem is that of overstaffing. During the boom, firms could be profitable with
_more workers than they might really have needed but the recession has created a harsher
environment. Restoring long-term profitability in a number of automobile firms, including
Volkswagen, will mean the loss of 2-300,000 jobs by the middle of the 1990s. For the same
reason, large job losses are likely in the steel industry, and for Lufthansa. A depressing
estimate from the chief of the industrial consulting firm McKinsey-Germany is that the
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recession will lead to the permanent loss of 2 million to 2.5 million jobs in the former West
Germany. 16
Closely connected with job loss is the problem of competitiveness on the world .
market. In a number of "older" industrial areas, such as steel, basic chemicals, or non,.
luxury automobile production, German firms are facing a growing challenge from low-wage
competitors: the newly industrialized countries of East Asia, and, increasingly, some of the
former communist nations of Eastern Europe. During the unification boom, when everyone
in the ex-GDR had to have a car, and flush West Germans were willing to buy new ones as
well, there was room for domestic and foreign firms alike. (To judge by what I saw in the
summer of 1991, Nissans seemed to be a particular favorite in the former East Germany, but
there were also plenty of the cheaper VWs and Opels being driven around.) In a less ,
favorable environment, these older industries are faced with a serious competitive threat,
that, at best, can only be stemmed bi .large-scale layoffs to produce more cheaply.
At the same time, West German businesses have been finding it difficult to establish
themselves in the high-tech gowth sectors of the world economy. German firms do have
very strong positions in computerized machine tools, complex medical appliances, telecommunications and specialty chemicals, although the recession has taken a toll in these areas.
However, in what are usually regarded as the three areas with the most growth poten- ·
tial-aerospace, microelectronics, and genetic engineering-German manufacturers are at best
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lagging behind their counterparts in Japan and the United States or are totally out of the
running. 17
These difficult prospects for business in the former West Germany cast a shadow over
developments in the former East Germany. Only a prosperous, growing western Germany
can provide the large sums that will have to be transferred to and invested in eastern
Germany for years to come in order to create the bases for prosperity there. Should the
current recession lead to a serious, permanent decline in economic activity in western
Germany, or businesses there fall behind in competition for important growth sectors, these
funds will no longer be available.

3. Economics and Politics in a United Germany

If Chancellor Kohl's coalition received a powerful vote of confidence from the

electorate in December 1990, at the highpoint of the unification boom, the economic
difficulties stemming from his government's unification policies soon made their appearance
and threatened his political position. After promising repeatedly in their re-election
campaign that unification would require no new taxes, no sooner were the coalition
politicians returned to office than they began announcing tax and fee increases. The
Chancellor's CDU received the voters' response when it was disastrously defeated in the
elections to the state parliament of Rheinland-Pfalz in April 1991, losing control of the
government in that generally conservative and clerically minded part of Germany, for the

17
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On these points, see Konrad Seitz, "Fortschritt fangt im Kopf an," Die Zeit, 21 May
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first time in decades. Politicians, journalists and public opinion pollsters alike attributed this
remarkable outcome to voter anger about the federal government's "tax lie." The CDU
· suffered further defeats in the state elections in Baden-Wiirttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein
the following year. Public confidence in the government declined at a rate never before
seen, since the introduction of public opinion polling to Germany after the Second World
War. 18
The response of the government to these setbacks was to launch a campaign to divert
public attention from the difficulties of reunification and towards .another consequence of the
end of the communist regimes in Europe, the growing numbers of foreigners seeking political
asylum in Germany. Article 16 of the 1949 West German constitution had guaranteed
asylum to victims of political persecution, but this had been one of that constitution's many
gestures of repudiation of the Nazi past, with little in the way of political consequences for
decades.
There were
some 10,000 applications for political asylum filed in 1980; by 1988,
.
.
the figure had reached 103,000. There was a growing, and probably justified, suspicion that
many of those seeking asylum in West Germany were not actually victims of political
persecution, but citizens of poor countries, seeking to live in a wealthier one.
In the second half of the decade, such asylum seekers were joined by a a growing
number of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe (many of whom did not speak the language
and were "Germans" only by courtesy of a distant ancestor) who received permission to
18

Die Zeit issues of 3 May 1991and 17 April 1992 have excellent coverage on the state
elections, including polling results by the "Forschungsgruppe Wahlen" at the University of
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19
emigrate from the liberalized communist regimes. There were 377,000 of them in 1989.
Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, some one half million immigrants were reaching
West Germany yearly, crowding onto the job and housing markets, and for that reason
provoking an increasing amount of hostility. The events of 1989-90 opened borders to the
east and increased the flow of immigration still further. 1992 marked a highpoint, with·
450,000 asylum seekers and 220,000 ethnic Germans entering the country. 19
Following the major electoral defeat of the CDU in the state elections in RhinelandPfalz, Chancel~or Kohl's government decided to place the issue of foreigners in Germany at
the center of political debate. Prominent CDU politicians demanded a constitutional
amendment, strictly limiting the guarantees of political asylum offered by Paragraph 16 and
denouncing the opposition SPD's refusal to support such an amendment (requiring a twothirds majority in parliament) as responsible for the current state of affairs. The CDU's
General Secretary went so far as to speak of "SPD asylum seekers."

The General Secretary

of the CSU, tbe CDU's Bavarian wing, added fuel to the fire, announcing that if the SPD did
not support a change in the constitution, Bavaria would deport all the asylum seekers on its
territory to federal states with SPD governments. 20
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This campaign produced a number of important results, although not entirely those
that its initators had hoped for. · By demonstrating that government leaders and prominent
politicians wanted to get rid of the growing number of foreigners coming into Germany, it
legitimized and encouraged the outbreak of violent hostility towards them. A whole series of
violent attacks on foreigners, attracting world-wide attention, followed in 1991 and 1992, in
both eastern and western Germany. The pattern of violence differed in the two halves of the
country. The east saw mobs storming the temporary housing for asylum seekers, while"
bystanders looked on sympathetically and the police were nowhere to be found. In the west,
attacks were more likely to be the work of individuals or small groups, involving throwing
rocks or setting fires (in two instances with fatal results). 21
Common to both parts of the country, was the identity of the active assailants. They
were typically young men, most under twenty years of age, unemployed or working in low
wage, low skill jobs, generally from lower class backgrounds. They and their families had
not done well in the 1980s and saw discouraging future prospects, for which they were only
too happy to blame foreigners (particularly dark-skinned ones), especially after neo-Nazi

21

Kuno Kruse and Micheal Schweden, "Brandstifter und Biedermiinner," Die Zeit, 11 Sept.
1992, is on the anti-foreign riots in Rostock, in eastern Germany; Thomas Kleine Brockhoff, Kuno
Kruse and Ulrich Stock, "Molln, Deutschland," Die Zeit, 18 Dec. 1992, describes the perpetrators
of a sensational case of arson against foreigners in western Germany.

21
agitators had stirred them up to it and much more respectable politicians had tacitly
encouraged their grievances. 22

·

The political fallout of this campaign was also not entirely what the government had
hoped for. One of its goals was achieved, weakening the opposition SPD. Vacillating, split
and unsure on the question of whether to support a constitutional amendment changing the
rules on the granting of political asylum, unable as well to offer a convincing alternative to
the government's unsuccessful policies for encouraging economic development in the former
East Germany, the SPD was unable to take advantage of the government's declining
popularity. In a quite unusual situation, ·the popularity of both the government aQ.d the
opposition declined. 23
The prime beneficiaries of the campaign were the parties of the extreme right. Before
1989, they had increasingly focused their political agitation on stirring up hostility to
foreigners and had scored some successes in state and local elections with this theme. The
events of 1989-90 had taken them by surprise and they were completely overwhelmed in the
elections of 1990. The return of the asylum issue to the center of political debate gave them
a renewed opportunity and they exploited it to the fullest, scoring some major victories:
12.3% of the vote in the state elections in Baden-Wiirttemberg in April 1992, 8.3% in the
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local government elections in Hessen in March 1993. Along with these results, public
opinion polls began to reveal that a growing number of Germans, in both east and west, were
becoming ever more discontent with the existing democratic institutions that seemed unable
to deal with the country's economic problems, or resolve the issues surrounding immigration.24
These same polls show that an overwhelming majority of Germans condemn violence
against foreigners and those who practice it; they also show that most voters for the extreme
right-wing parties are not firm supporters but protest voters, expressing their discontent about
the inability of either the federal government or the opposition to come up with convincing
remedies for the country's problems. Alarmist comments about a new wave of Nazism in
Germany therefore seem unjustified and exaggerated, especially when considering the
considerable popularity of xenophobic, right wing groups in other European countries, such
as the .Front National in France, or the Lombard Leagues in Italy (to say nothing of Poland,
Rumania, or the former Yugoslavia). However, unless Germans' skeptical attitudes about
the major political parties and about the competence of their government change by 1994,
when elections are scheduled for the federal government and the government of a number of
the German states, the results of these elections are likely to resemble the ones in the recent
state elections: losses of the major parties, gains for the extreme right. The upshot may
well be that it will be difficult to form a strong federal government with a convincing
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majority behind it in the German parliament. This would be unfortunate,- because Germany
clearly needs a government capable of taking- strong and decisive action to deal with the
unexpected economic and social consequences of unification.

4. Germans and other Europeans

The changed· domestic circumstances of the last three years have had a profound
· effect on relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the nations of the EEC,
and, more broadly, all European countries. In this final section, I will· look at three areas
where domestic politics has had a substantial impact on Germany's position in Europe: the
civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the collapse of the European monetary system, and the
severe weakening of the Maastricht accord provisions for moving towards a European
monetary union, and the issue of population movements between European countries.
Clearly one of the decisive turning points for the situation in the former Yugoslavia
was the November 1991 decision of the German government, in a sharp turnabout from its
previous position, to recognize the secessionist republics of Croatia and Slovenia, and to
pressure, successfully the other EEC countries to do the same. This international recognition
was the signal for an all-out civil war. A major reason for this turnabout was found in
German domestic affairs: a campaign organized by the CDU and the mass media sympathetic to its point of view. Behind this were clerical sympathies for the Catholic republics
Croatia and Slovenia and hopes of avoiding a new wave of refugee foreigners coming to
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Germany by stabilizing the situation in the Balkans. This last hope was misguided, to say
the least. 25
The disruption of the Maastricht process has very largely been a result of the
economic consequences of German unification. Here, the causal link has gone from the
large German government deficits, much of which was used for consumption and not for
productive investment in the former East Germany, leading to inflation, that in tum led the

Bundesbank to raise interest rates. High German interest rates meant substantial capital
flows to Germany, putting s~vere pressure on currencies linked to the DM in the European
monetary system. Ministries of finance and central banks faced a unpleasant choice: they
could raise interest rates, thus getting some of this capital back and ·maintaining the value of
their currency vis-a-vis the DM: Such higher interest rates would mean weakening economic
activity and making it difficult to recover from the recession of the early 1990s. An
alternative would have been to end the fixed exchange rates, allowing their currencies to float
downwards against the Mark. Such a devaluation would have increased the chances for.
inflation and also brought to an end the system of fixed exchange rates, that had sustained
and encouraged trade with the EEC for almost twenty years. The third possible choice, just
doing nothing, would have meant that countries sooner or later would have lost all their
foreign currency reserves and would have had to make one choice or the other.
After some painful experiences defending their currencies, Great Britain and Italy
opted for devaluation and leaving the exchange rate mechanism. The French government
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kept interest rates up, defending the franc, and exacerbating that country's severe recession.
{!ltimately, this past summer, the whole exchange rate mechanism was dismantled, allowing
the Common Market currencies to fluctuate against each other. This was a decisive step
against the economic integration proposed in the Maastricht process, in tum a direct result of
German unification.
Finally, there is the question of immigration into Germany, but more broadly, into the
more prosperous <countries of western and northern Europe, from the poorer lands to the east
and south. This is

~

particularly difficult issue for Germany, since its short term and long

term interests are so sharply in contrast. At the moment, with the unresolved difficulties of
the economic transition in the east, and the severe recession leading to high unemployment,
the last thing that Germany needs is more people in the labor market. The country's
birthrate is extremely low, though, and the population aging, so over the next several
decades additional labor, on the order of 3-500,000 immigrants per year, will be necessary to
keep the economy running. 26
There is no simple way out of this dilemma. Amending the constitution to restrict
political asylum, as was finally decided this summer, might help at first, although it will
probably just tend to drive immigrants and immigration into illegality. Probably the most
plausible step in a positive direction, although a very difficult one to take, would be official
recognition that Germany has become a country of immigration. The current circumstances
under which actual immigration is hidden behind the policies of ethnic reunification
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(Germans in eastern Europe returning to Germany) and claims of political asylum could give
way to an ordered immigration policy, with yearly quotas and liberalized rules on immigrants
obtaining German citizenship. 27 Such administrative revisions would work best in a more ·
favorable economic climate, one in which self-sustaining economic growth in the former East
Germany has been obtained, where unemployment across the country is declining and the
current housing shortage ·is resolved by the construction of more affordable housing. Then
immigrants would be easier to accept, since they would not be seen as competitors for scarce
jobs and housing.
In many ways, both the domestic problems within Germany and the difficulties in the
relationship between Germany and other European countries boil down to problems of
economic development. These in tum reflect the lack of success in reconstructing the
economy of the ex-GDR and integrating it into the world market. In a post-Cold War
Europe, where a potential east-west military confrontation is no longer a prospect, and where
conflicts between rich and poor-both between and within different countries-and over
economic development have been a major source of tension, German economic policy has
increasingly come to have a broader relevance for European ·security. The idea that the
process of reconstruction and integration of the former East Germany would be painless and
brought about by the self-activating forces of the market has proved to be an illusion. More
realistic policies are needed to meet the needs of the moment.
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